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The rationing of health care is not new. If we are interested in the origins of health economics we should remember 1699 (not quite a tercentennial). This was the year that William Petty published his discourse that evaluated many things including human beings in "Political Arithmetick". Since then the investment in health has depended on the wealth of the individual or state and the emphasis on health provision. In 1978 the World Health Organisation met at Alma Ata and defined the factors that led to the allocation of primary care resources; economic conditions, socio-cultural attitudes and political characteristics.
One of the greatest problems with publicly funded health care is a high rate of inflation. As the population becomes relatively more elderly greater demands ensue. Improvements in imaging and treatment technologies result in cost increases which are additional to underlying inflation. New drug therapies are expensive to develop and therefore newer drugs cost more. Politicians and the media have artificially raised expectations that have financial implications. The failure to keep up with "medical hyperinflation" was most dramatically seen in Britain in the 1980's. Inability to finance real cost increases led to cuts in services, although many politicians, in "Marie Antoinette" fashion, insisted that things were getting better.
Professor Ham has calculated that the real annual increase in hospital funding during the 1980's was 1.6% above general inflation. This was insufficient to match medical inflation and produced a cumulative deficit in hospital funding. The public were misled by statistics that seemed to indicate that the finances of hospitals were improving in relation to baseline inflation but this was of little relevance. Health spending has been described as a bottomless pit. Enoch Powell described an "infinity of demand" in 'A New look at Medicine and Politics'. Such facile but fallacious logic is often used to defend decisions where improvements in healthcare have been prevented because of significant cost implications. This is seen in the underprovision of intensive care beds.
In the early 1980's a working group under Norman Fowler looked at alternative funding for health. While private financing was attractive this would lead to higher spending with some improvements in health, as evidenced by the USA. The cheapest system was to use taxes to pay for health while central control could restrict growth in provision. No official report from this working party was ever published.
Improvements were obviously needed in NHS management and the "grocer" Roy Griffiths produced a report of how the system could be changed to more closely resemble "Sainsbury's" efficiency. Many good quality managers were appointed and major changes were foreseen. However, when political interference became rife, many of these managers resigned.
The Department of Health and Social Services realised that cuts would have to be made by health authorities. No guidance was given to where these cuts should be made. No official recognition of the inevitable cuts was politically palatable and a new term was coined, Cost Improvement Programmes [CIP's]. These programmes were introduced and were frequently euphemisms for many service cuts. Propaganda was more important than actual improvement in treatment. In the 1980's there was steadfast opposition to public acceptance of rationing or honestly, admitting that certain services could no longer be provided by the NHS. The Government determinedly ensured that the finance debate should not be raised. Instead of recognising the effects of serious underfunding, the emphasis was put on blaming the existing system of delivery for the majority of the problems. This is a recurring theme.
Originally described by Enthoven in 1985, the idea of a market where hospitals would compete for resources was given the full backing of some politicians. The idea was developed by organisations not universally acclaimed for their concerns for the sick or disadvantaged members of society. It was actually the Adam Smith Institute and the Centre for Policy Studies that developed the ideas of 'The Internal Market'.
Kenneth Clarke drew up the white paper, "Working for Patients", published in 1989. This had major implications for acute hospital services. With great political wisdom, it was stated that the real aims of the changes were to raise standards of care, to place a greater emphasis on health promotion and to offer a wider choice. It was suggested [perhaps a little cynically] that the changes might detach politicians from criticism for inevitable future cuts by blaming health authorities and acute hospitals instead. The major problem of underlying cumulative underfunding was not to be corrected. The government and DHSS would not openly admit that certain areas of health care might need to be removed from the NHS if stretched health authorities and acute hospital units were to handle difficult situations.
Stresses became clear between health authorities and hospital trusts as a result of government underfunding. Since those in power in these organisations were often regarded by the public as "bungling bureaucrats", blame could be very effectively removed from "the centre". Many people believed that the mythical administrator's paradise of St Edward's Hospital [in "Yes Minister"] was close to real life. This was a very efficient hospital with many offices and administrators where "there would probably be some patients when the financial situation has eased up".
It would be wrong not to recognise the improvements in many aspects of the National Health Service since the White paper of 1989. Management is vastly improved at hospital level. Financial control is better and the importance of strategic planning is realised. From the patients' point of view the service is better focused and more accountable. Despite popular assumptions, the fraction of costs attributed to trust hospitals' management is low, considering the complexity and relative size of the budgets. This area is likely to become a target for "efficiencies" as cumulative underfunding, the real problem, persists and other scape-goats are sought.
Resources have been appropriated in the past, based on selective medical assumptions and compounded by management consultants' teams who were 'feeling their way' in the new seller-buyer scheme for health. In surgical services the assertion that procedures would become overwhelmingly laparoscopic and associated with short-term admissions was embraced by government departments despite lack of evidence. The belief that fewer elderly patients would require admission to medical units was wishful thinking. Self delusion about future demands seemed to be the order of the day because it fitted fiscal restrictions. The most basic economic assessment of treatments requires a step analysis consisting of the selection of alternatives, costing and comparison of outcomes. Unfortunately we place an emphasis on the short term costings. There is a lack of understanding of what cost means in a limited overall budget. In these situations costs need to be defined in terms of the opportunity that has been denied if the investments were diverted to their best alternative use. There is no useful strategy or model that allows a mechanism for determining 'best alternative use'.
Best alternative use in trust terms may be that which improves the hospital's image. This is seen when technologically advanced high profile specialties which are relatively overresourced expand, to the detriment of less glamorous areas. For the community the best possible use might be to replace cheap psychiatric drugs with more expensive versions that ensure better patient compliance.
Cost-effectiveness is a crude measure that must not be used as a stand-alone factor to determine policy. It simply produces a ratio of a measured effect, such as the cost of a treatment for one patient for one month divided by the percentage of patients successfully responding to the treatment. Equal importance is given to increments of cost 
